Enrique A. Bour
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Corrupción: Hacia un Enfoque Teórico y Empírico
By Enrique A. Bour, August 2011, presented at the XLVI Reunión Anual de la Asociación Argentina de Economía Política, November 2011, Universidad de Mar del Plata.

This article pertains to a larger treatise in Law of Economics directed by Juan Sola and prefaced by Nobel prize Edmund S. Phelps. The JEL classifies corruption under the heading of Public Organizations. Why? We begin by following the suggestions by Vito Tanzi. Corruption has been increasingly studied recently by many scholars, -- Cheung, Rose-Ackerman, Schenone, Canavese, etc. Corruption has many negative effects on the economic welfare of nations, as well as on the morale of its citizens. We follow Schenone and Gregg in their characterization of corruption from the point of view of theology, as well as Hardin and Elinor Ostrom in the property rights implications of the “tragedy of the commons”, up to Canavese who clearly exposes how the dual tragedy of the “anti-commons” (Heller) can be used to explain the amount of corruption in a society. A theorem by Canavese underlines that the punishement of corruption may give place to a worse resource allocation that the absence of punishement; that the organized crime may be preferable to the disorganized one; and that competitivity between potentially corrupt agents may prevent the effects of corruption on resource allocation. We end this article by pointing to some econometrics done with corruption (throughout the article we emphasize several cases of measurement of corruption at the world level and some resonant cases of corruption in the recent history of Argentina). The presentation includes an extension of these points.

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Comentarios a la Ponencia de Enrique Bour
By Enrique García Viñuela, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, presented at the XLVI Reunión Anual de la Asociación Argentina de Economía Política, November 2011, Universidad de Mar del Plata
Respuesta a los comentarios
By Enrique A. Bour, presented at the XLVI Reunión Anual de la Asociación Argentina de Economía Política, November 2011, Universidad de Mar del Plata.



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